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KNOCK, KNOCK.  WHO’S THERE?: UNDERCOVER 
OFFICERS, POLICE INFORMANTS, AND THE  
“CONSENT ONCE REMOVED” DOCTRINE 
Adam A. Khalil ∗ 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The right of a person to be free from unreasonable government 
intrusion into his home has long been recognized throughout this 
nation’s history.
1
  Indeed, the ancient adage that a man’s home is his 
castle
2
 finds support in the Constitution because “the chief evil 
against which the wording of the Fourth Amendment is directed” is 
the “physical entry of the home.”
3
  To protect this interest, the Fourth 
Amendment requires that agents of the government seek a warrant 
prior to entering a home.
4
  But this requirement is not absolute.  
Generally, government agents may enter a house without a warrant in 
two situations: (1) judicially created warrant exceptions and (2) law 
enforcement activity found to be reasonable and thus outside the 
bounds of the Fourth Amendment’s purview.
5
  Within the latter cate-
gory falls the Consent Once Removed Doctrine (CORD), which al-
lows an undercover officer, or sometimes an informant, who has 
gained consensual entry into a dwelling, to call for backup officers to 




 ∗  J.D., May 2010, Seton Hall University School of Law; B.A., 2007, Nazareth Col-
lege of Rochester.  Thanks to Professor Cornwell for his supervision and guidance 
and to Andrew Boulay for his direction and assistance. 
 1 Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 511–12 (1961); see also Boyd v. United 
States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886) (recognizing “the sanctity of a man’s home and the 
privacies of life”). 
 2 Miller v. United States, 357 U.S. 301, 307 (1958). 
 3 United States v. U.S. Dist. Ct., 407 U.S. 297, 313 (1972). 
 4 U.S. CONST. amend. IV; Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 748 (1984). 
 5 United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 682 (1985) (“The Fourth Amendment is 
not, of course, a guarantee against all searches and seizures, but only against unrea-
sonable searches and seizures.”). 
 6 Callahan v. Millard Cnty., 494 F.3d 891, 901 (10th Cir. 2007)(Kelly, J., dissent-
ing) (discussing how the consensual entry in a CORD situation alleviates the warrant 
requirement), rev’d on different grounds sub nom. Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223 
(2009). 
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The CORD has developed primarily to enable law enforcement 
to use undercover police officers to gain entry into a home and make 
arrests upon discovering illegal activity or contraband.
7
  The underly-
ing rationale is to allow an undercover officer, who has observed il-
legal activity, to summon aid in effectuating an arrest.  The doctrine 
is considered essential for ensuring officer safety and preventing the 
destruction or loss of evidence that may result from not arresting the 
suspect and seizing the contraband immediately.
8
 
Every court that has considered the issue has validated the 
CORD as an extension of recognized judicial doctrines allowing war-
rantless entry by law enforcement.  Disagreement has occurred, how-
ever, as to whom the doctrine may be applied.  Specifically, courts are 
divided as to whether the doctrine should extend beyond undercover 
police to lay informants working with police.  The concern is that ap-
plying the doctrine to lay police informants will violate the restric-
tions and protections of the Fourth Amendment,
9
 and essentially, 
render them “a nullity.”
10
  These fears are based largely on two risks: 
(1) that informants will not adhere to the legal mandates of the 
Fourth Amendment, as police generally do, which restrict the scope 
of searches in a CORD context
11
 and (2) the increased privacy intru-




This Comment argues that the CORD is a valid extension of rec-
ognized judicial doctrines when applied to undercover police offic-
ers, but should be invalid when applied to police informants.  Part II 
of this Comment will discuss the development of the CORD, which 
resulted from the application of judicial doctrines that allow for the 
warrantless entry of additional officers into a home in the event that 
an undercover officer has gained consensual entry, has probable 
cause to believe a crime has occurred, and then requests aid in effec-
tuating an arrest, as well as the various analytical approaches taken by 
 
 7 See, e.g., Callahan, 555 U.S. at 228 (describing use of CORD to gain entry 
through undercover officers, who then saw illegal activity and called other officers to 
effect an arrest); United States v. Romero, 452 F.3d 610, 619 (6th Cir. 2006) (same); 
United States v. Yoon, 398 F.3d 802, 806 (6th Cir. 2005) (same). 
 8 See, e.g., Tim Sobczak, Note, The Consent-Once-Removed Doctrine: The Constitutio-
nality of Passing Consent from an Informant to Law Enforcement, 62 FLA. L. REV. 493, 507 
(2010). 
 9 See, e.g., United States v. Jachimko, 905 F. Supp. 540, 546–47 (N.D. Ill. 1995). 
 10 See, e.g., id. at 546 (quoting Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948)). 
 11 See, e.g., id. at 547. 
 12 United States v. Akinsanya, 53 F.3d 852, 856 (7th Cir. 1995). 
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a number of appellate courts.  Part III looks to the various approach-
es that courts have used to analyze the CORD based on privacy inter-
ests, consent, and the power of citizens’ arrest in various states.  Last-
ly, Part IV argues that the CORD should not extend to undercover 
police informants and should apply only to police officers because of 
the Supreme Court’s required balancing of interests when analyzing 
Fourth Amendment issues. 
II. DEVELOPMENT OF THE CORD 
A. The Fourth Amendment: Balancing Reasonableness 
The Fourth Amendment provides the essential right of one to be 
free from unreasonable searches or seizures by law enforcement.
13
  It 
does so in two separate clauses: one protects the basic right to be free 
from unreasonable searches and seizures, and the other requires that 
a warrant be particular in scope and supported by probable cause for 
any such unreasonable searches to be valid.
14
  Furthermore, the Su-
preme Court has found the home to be subject to specific protection 
as “physical entry of the home is the chief evil against which the word-
ing of the Fourth Amendment is directed.”
15
  Because of this concern, 
warrantless searches are generally considered unreasonable per se.
16
  
Although some exceptions to this rule exist, they are “jealously and 
carefully drawn.”
17
  Where a search is reasonable, though, it need not 





 13 The Fourth Amendment states, 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, 
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be vi-
olated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, sup-
ported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to 
be searched, and the persons or things to be seized. 
U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
 14 Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 584 (1980). 
 15 United States v. U.S. Dist. Ct., 407 U.S. 297, 313 (1972). 
 16 See, e.g., Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967). 
 17 Jones v. United States, 357 U.S. 493, 499 (1958); see also Kyllo v. United States, 
533 U.S. 27, 31 (2001) (“With few exceptions, the question whether a warrantless 
search of a home is reasonable and hence constitutional must be answered no.” (cit-
ing Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 181 (1990); Payton, 445 U.S. at 586)). 
 18 Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 31 (“‘At the very core’ of the Fourth Amendment ‘stands the 
right of a man to retreat into his own home and there be free from unreasonable go-
vernmental intrusion.’” (emphasis added)(quoting Silverman v. United States, 365 
U.S. 505, 511 (1961))). 
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As a preliminary matter, it is important to note the balancing of 
interests that the Supreme Court has acknowledged must occur 
whenever a warrantless search is at issue.  Generally, the test of any 
government intrusion on privacy is one of reasonableness
19
 compris-
ing two prongs: a subjective expectation of privacy and an objective 
analysis as to whether society is prepared to accept such an expecta-
tion.
20
  The subjective expectation requires an individual to actually 
believe that he has a right to privacy; the objective prong requires the 
Court to determine if such an expectation is reasonable and one 
which society is prepared to recognize.
21
  Only when these two prongs 
are met may government action be so intrusive as to be deemed un-
reasonable, and thus violative of the Fourth Amendment.  But once a 
privacy right is established, the Supreme Court requires that the gov-
ernment interests involved in the intrusion be weighed against the 
privacy interests upon which the government intruded to determine 
whether the government’s actions are reasonable under the Fourth 
Amendment.
22
  Additionally, wherever consent is given, a court is not 
 
 19 United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 118 (2001) (“The touchstone of the 
Fourth Amendment is reasonableness . . . .”) 
 20 This test was first announced in Justice Harlan’s concurring opinion in Katz v. 
United States: 
My understanding of the rule that has emerged from prior decisions is 
that there is a twofold requirement, first that a person have [sic] exhi-
bited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy and, second, that the 
expectation be one that society is prepared to recognize as “reasona-
ble.”  Thus a man’s home is, for most purposes, a place where he ex-
pects privacy, but objects, activities, or statements that he exposes to 
the “plain view” of outsiders are not “protected” because no intention 
to keep them to himself has been exhibited.   
389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).   
 21 The Supreme Court’s holding in O’Connor v. Ortega defines how reasonable-
ness may be determined: 
We have no talisman that determines in all cases those privacy expecta-
tions that society is prepared to accept as reasonable.  Instead, “the 
Court has given weight to such factors as the intention of the Framers 
of the Fourth Amendment, the uses to which the individual has put a 
location, and our societal understanding that certain areas deserve the 
most scrupulous protection from government invasion.”   
480 U.S. 709, 715 (1987) (quoting Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 178 
(1984))); see also Oliver, 466 U.S. at 187 (“The liberty shielded by the Fourth 
Amendment, as we have often acknowledged, is freedom ‘from unreasonable gov-
ernment intrusions into . . . legitimate expectations of privacy.’”  (quoting United 
States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 7 (1977))). 
 22 See, e.g., Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 654 (1979) (“[T]he permissibility of 
a particular law enforcement practice is judged by balancing its intrusion on the in-
dividual’s Fourth Amendment interests against its promotion of legitimate govern-
mental interests.”)  . 
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required to analyze reasonableness because Fourth Amendment pro-
tections are deemed to have been waived.
23
 
B. Elements of the CORD 
Although most courts analyze the CORD as having three ele-
ments,
24
 the doctrine is essentially composed of four different legal 
principles: (1) officers may gain entry into a home through ruse or 
deception; (2) following entry, officers may make warrantless arrests 
for any crimes which they have probable cause to believe are occur-
ring; (3) to promote officer safety, additional officers may enter with-
out a warrant to help effectuate an arrest; and (4) following arrest, 
the officers inside a home may conduct limited searches incident to 
arrest, seize items in plain view, and conduct protective sweeps, all 
without rendering the entry, arrest, or searches unreasonable.
25
  The 
Supreme Court of the United States has already decided the constitu-
tionality of all the elements that make up the CORD except the 
third—the entry of additional officers.  This Part will therefore briefly 
address the already settled principles before turning to the validity of 
the entry of additional officers. 
1. Using Deception to Gain Consent to Enter a Dwelling 
The Supreme Court recognized in Lewis v. United States that gov-
ernment agents have the ability to use stratagem or deception to filter 
out criminal activity and that undercover police activity is a necessary 
tactic of law enforcement.
26
  Accordingly, the Court refused to hold 
that the government agent’s use of deception to gain consent to en-
ter a dwelling was a violation of the Fourth Amendment.
27
  Instead, 
the Court specifically noted that the use of undercover agents is a 
 
 23 See, e.g., Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 181 (1990) (citing Schneckloth v. 
Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 242–43 (1973)). 
 24 See, e.g., United States v. Bramble, 103 F.3d 1475, 1478 (9th Cir. 1996) (citing 
United States v. Akinsanya, 53 F.3d 852, 856 (7th Cir. 1995)); United States v. Ja-
chimko, 19 F.3d 296, 298–99 (7th Cir. 1994). 
 25 United States v. Yoon, 398 F.3d 802, 806 n.1 (6th Cir. 2005); Bramble, 103 F.3d 
at 1478. 
 26 385 U.S. 206, 208–09 (1966) (citing Grimm v. United States, 156 U.S. 604, 610 
(1895); see also Andrews v. United States, 162 U.S. 420, 423 (1896)).  While Lewis is 
the seminal case regarding the use of undercover officers, the Court has reaffirmed 
its holding over the years.  See, e.g., United States v. Jimenez Recio, 537 U.S. 270 
(2003); Maryland v. Macon, 472 U.S. 463, 470 (1985); United States v. Russell, 411 
U.S. 423, 445 (1973). 
 27 Lewis, 385 U.S. at 208. 
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 and that disallowing the use of deception 
would “come near to a rule that the use of undercover agents in any 
manner is virtually unconstitutional per se.”
29
 
Moreover, while the Court recognized that the home has been 
accorded the full range of Fourth Amendment protections,
30
 the 
Court also noted that when “the home is converted into a commer-
cial center . . . for purposes of transacting unlawful business, that 
business is entitled to no greater sanctity than if it were carried on in 
a store, a garage, a car, or on the street.”
31
  The Court also observed 
that undercover agents should not be prevented from doing what an 
ordinary citizen may do merely because of their law-enforcement 
function—“[a] government agent, in the same manner as a private 
person, may accept an invitation to do business and may enter upon 
the premises for the very purposes contemplated by the occupant.”
32
 
In addition, because a contrary holding would have severely 
hampered police efforts to ferret out criminal activity, the Court 
ruled that where consent to enter is given, the fact that the govern-
ment agent is operating under a ruse or deception does not vitiate 
this consent so long as the agent acts within the scope of authority 
given.
33
  The Court was careful, however, to limit the scope of what 
such agents may do upon entry in order to ensure that such an ex-
ception to the Fourth Amendment be drawn narrowly.
34
  So long as 
law enforcement agents act within the bounds of consent given, their 
entry without a warrant will not be deemed violative of the Fourth 




 28 Id. at 210 n.6. 
 29 Id. at 210. 
 30 Id. at 211. 
 31 Id. 
 32 Id. 
 33 Lewis, 385 U.S. at 210–11. 
 34 Id. at 211; id. at 212–13 (Brennan, J., concurring) (stating that one who allows 
an undercover agent to enter his home may not complain that his privacy has been 
invaded so long as the agent acts within the scope contemplated as the reason for the 
initial entry). 
 35 Some commentators have argued that the initial grant of consent to an infor-
mant or officer inherently limits his ability to grant further consent to backup offic-
ers.  See, e.g., Sobczak, supra note 8, at 502.  While this limit may have relevance in an 
ordinary search, once an officer establishes probable cause to arrest and initiates an 
arrest, he may then carry out additional searches, see discussion infra Part II.B.3, not-
withstanding the limits on the original consent given.  This is part of the “more” 
Judge Kelly noted as an additional basis for the CORD in Callahan when noting that 
the doctrine is based on “more than consent alone.”  Callahan v. Millard Cnty., 494 
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2. Warrantless Arrests Based on Probable Cause 
Police have long possessed the authority to arrest someone who 
they have probable cause to believe has committed a crime in their 
presence.
36
  In relation to the CORD, though, the Fourth Amend-
ment analysis is complicated by the fact that the arrest normally takes 
place in the arrestee’s own home.  This complication arises because 
the Supreme Court specifically held in Payton v. New York that war-
rantless entries into a home to effect an arrest, even for a felony, are 
unconstitutional.
37
  But because the CORD is premised on entry 
gained with consent, Payton is inapplicable.
38
  Thus, in the typical 
CORD case, where an officer gains consent to enter a dwelling and 
subsequent events give rise to probable cause that the occupant is en-
gaging in a felony, the officer may arrest the occupant without a war-
rant while avoiding any violation of the Fourth Amendment. 
3. Searches Incident to Arrest 
Although the CORD primarily focuses on the entry of additional 
officers, noting the scope of searches that may be conducted without 
a warrant following an arrest is instructive.
39
  Specifically, police and 
 
F.3d 891, 901 (10th Cir. 2007) (Kelly, J., dissenting), rev’d on different grounds sub nom. 
Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223 (2009). 
 36 See, e.g., United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 417 (1976) (holding that offic-
ers may arrest those who they have probable cause to believe have committed a felo-
ny); Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 354 (2001) (finding that an officer 
may arrest someone for even a minor criminal offense without violating the Fourth 
Amendment, so long as they have probable cause to believe the person violated the 
law). 
 37 Watson, 423 U.S. at 417. 
 38 Id. at 583. 
 39 No warrant is required when a search is reasonable, and therefore, one ordina-
rily is not needed in a situation which falls under the CORD.  See supra note 5 and 
accompanying text.  But, it is also important to recognize that the mere fact that a 
warrant could be obtained does not invalidate an otherwise lawful search or arrest.  
Vale v. Louisiana, 399 U.S. 30, 40 (1970) (Black, J., dissenting).  In United States v. Ra-
binowitz, the Court explained that the failure to obtain a warrant does not automati-
cally invalidate a search.  
A rule of thumb requiring that a search warrant always be procured 
whenever practicable may be appealing from the vantage point of easy 
administration.  But we cannot agree that this requirement should be 
crystallized into a sine qua non to the reasonableness of a search.  It is 
fallacious to judge events retrospectively and thus to determine, consi-
dering the time element alone, that there was time to procure a search 
warrant.  Whether there was time may well be dependent upon consid-
erations other than the ticking off of minutes or hours.  The judgment 
of the officers as to when to close the trap on a criminal committing a 
crime in their presence or who they have reasonable cause to believe is 
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law enforcement agents have a number of recognized exceptions to 
the warrant requirement that would allow them to conduct minimal 
searches following arrest: the plain view doctrine, searches incident to 
arrest, and protective sweeps.  Each is briefly analyzed below. 
a. Plain-View Doctrine 
The Supreme Court has held on numerous occasions that police 
may seize evidence in plain view without a warrant.
40
  Moreover, this 
allowance is not limited to situations when the police are executing a 
warrant; it applies to any situation when the police are lawfully lo-
cated and have lawful access to the item seized.
41
  Finally, the officers’ 
discovery of illegal items need not be inadvertent—because the offic-
ers have already intruded upon privacy interests, the discovery of 
items in plain view does not further impinge upon an individual’s 
privacy and thus inadvertence is not required.
42
 
Accordingly, in a CORD context, the initial officer, and any of-
ficers who enter a home as backup, may lawfully seize any illegal con-
traband that they discover so long as its criminal nature is immediate-
ly apparent.
43
  In addition, any officers carrying out either a search 
incident to arrest or a protective sweep may also seize evidence that 
happens to be in plain view.
44
  This obviously affords great flexibility 
to any law enforcement agent involved because in most CORD cases 
 
committing a felony is not determined solely upon whether there was 
time to procure a search warrant.  Some flexibility will be accorded law 
officers engaged in daily battle with criminals for whose restraint crim-
inal laws are essential. 
339 U.S. 56, 65 (1950); see also Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 333 (1987) (Powell, J., 
dissenting) (noting that to require police to always obtain a warrant whenever possi-
ble, even if not necessary, “may handicap law enforcement without enhancing priva-
cy interests”).  
 40 The Court defined the Plain View Doctrine in Coolidge v. New Hampshire: 
The [plain view] doctrine serves to supplement the prior justification—
whether it be a warrant for another object, hot pursuit, search incident 
to lawful arrest, or some other legitimate reason for being present un-
connected with a search directed against the accused—and permits the 
warrantless seizure.  Of course, the extension of the original justifica-
tion is legitimate only where it is immediately apparent to the police 
that they have evidence before them; the “plain view” doctrine may not 
be used to extend a general exploratory search from one object to 
another until something incriminating at last emerges.   
403 U.S. 443, 466 (1971). 
 41 Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 137 (1990). 
 42 Id. at 141–42. 
 43 Id. at 136. 
 44 Id. at 137. 
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the evidence required to convict the defendant is in plain view.  But 
because of the limited scope of the doctrine, no Fourth Amendment 
rights are implicated, and a lawful CORD entry remains constitution-
al despite any seizure of items in plain view. 
b. Searches Incident to Arrest 
The Supreme Court’s holding in Chimel v. California provides the 
requisite legal justification for officers to search an arrestee and to se-
ize any illegal contraband on his person or within his immediate con-
trol.
45
  Such a search, termed a search incident to arrest, is justified 
under privacy analysis because it prevents an arrestee from possibly 
gaining a weapon to resist arrest and from destroying any evidence 
that may be in his immediate area.
46
  The Supreme Court, though, 
has narrowly construed such searches.  Past decisions make clear that 
the Chimel doctrine disallows the general rummaging through draw-
ers and dressers or searches through rooms other than the room in 
which the arrest occurs in order to prevent an overbroad intrusion 
upon the arrestee’s privacy, for which a warrant is required.
47
  Be-
cause CORD cases predominantly involve drugs, however, such a 
search incident to arrest generally provides the requisite evidence ne-
cessary to prosecute and convict the arrestee and thus generally alle-
viates the officers’ need to obtain a warrant.
48
 
c. Protective Sweeps 
The seminal case on protective sweeps, Maryland v. Buie, pro-
vides that the Fourth Amendment permits a protective sweep when 
an “officer possesse[s] a reasonable belief based on specific and arti-
culable facts which, taken together with the rational inferences from 
those facts, reasonably warranted the officer in believing that the area 
swept harbored an individual posing a danger to the officer or oth-
 
 45 395 U.S. 752, 762–63 (1969). 
 46 Id. at 763. 
 47 Id. (“There is no comparable justification, however, for routinely searching any 
room other than that in which an arrest occurs . . . .  Such searches, in the absence of 
well-recognized exceptions, may be made only under the authority of a search war-
rant.”). 
 48 See, e.g., Callahan v. Millard Cnty., 494 F.3d 891, 893–94 (10th Cir. 2007) (not-
ing that upon a search of the arrestee, “the officers found evidence of a drug sale 
and possession”), rev’d on different grounds sub nom. Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223 
(2009). 
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  In light of this danger, the Court ruled that the intrusion on a 
person’s privacy, while not being de minimis, was outweighed by the 
government interest in protecting officers in an unfamiliar environ-
ment.
50
  But the Court specifically limited such searches to “extend 
only to a cursory inspection of those spaces where a person may be 
found.”
51
  Moreover, the search may not last any longer than is neces-
sary “to dispel the reasonable suspicion of danger and in any event no 
longer than it takes to complete the arrest and depart the premises.”
52
 
Thus, while officers without a warrant are bound by the consent 
given when entering a dwelling based on the CORD, those bounds 
may be stretched somewhat in that the officers may conduct searches 
incident to arrest under Chimel, perform protective sweeps of areas 
that may reasonably be believed to be harboring an attacker under 
Buie, and seize illegal items in plain view pursuant to Coolidge. Al-
though such searches are obviously limited in scope, law enforcement 
officers acting within the CORD are usually able to obtain sufficient 
evidence to prosecute a crime
53
 simply by the application of these 
three holdings. 
4. Entry of Additional Officers to Effectuate an Arrest 
The heart of the CORD is the entry of additional officers into a 
dwelling to assist in an arrest, and the effect that this entry has on the 
reasonableness of the intrusion for Fourth Amendment purposes.  
Further complicating the issue is the difference, if any, that arises 
when the person observing illegal activity is not a police officer but a 
police informant.  This element of the doctrine has engendered a 
split among the various Courts of Appeals that have addressed this is-
sue, and the Supreme Court has not yet offered any specific guid-
ance. 
 
 49 494 U.S. 325, 327 (1990) (citing Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1049–50 
(1983)) (internal citations and quotations omitted). 
 50 Id.  at 333–34. 
 51 Id. at 335. 
 52 Id. at 335–36. 
 53 Indeed, most CORD cases involve drugs, which the defendant in any given case 
normally displays to the undercover officer or informant.  See, e.g., United States v. 
Yoon, 398 F.3d 802, 803 (6th Cir. 2005) (showing marijuana to an informant ); Unit-
ed States v. Pollard, 215 F.3d 643, 649 (6th Cir. 2000) (displaying drugs to police of-
ficers); United States v. Akinsanya, 53 F.3d 852, 855 (7th Cir. 1995) (showing drugs 
to an informant); United States v. Diaz, 814 F.2d 454, 456 (7th Cir. 1987) (allowing 
undercover law enforcement agent to view, and chemically test, cocaine); New Jersey 
v. Henry, 627 A.2d 125, 127 (N.J. 1993) (selling crack cocaine to undercover detec-
tive).  
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In what appears to be the earliest case addressing the entry of 
additional officers to enter a residence to aid in an arrest, the U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held in United States v. White 
that the entry of various officers following consensual entry of an un-
dercover agent did not implicate the warrant requirement of the 
Fourth Amendment.
54
  The court based its decision on the fact that 
White, the defendant, had consented to the entry of one undercover 
agent and that, had the other undercover officer sought entry later, 
White would have admitted him back into the room.
55
  Therefore, the 
court held that, regardless of a magistrate’s neutral evaluation and is-
suance of a warrant, the same privacy intrusion would have resulted.
56
 
Five years later, in United States v. Paul, the Seventh Circuit was 
again called upon to determine whether the entry of police officers 
to effectuate an arrest was in violation of the Fourth Amendment.
57
  
This case differed from White in that instead of the initial entry being 
made by an undercover police officer, the police used an informant 
equipped with an electronic signaling device.
58
  The informant was 
instructed to signal police when he saw marijuana in plain view; once 
he did, the officers knocked on the door and, receiving no answer, 
entered and proceeded to the basement where they arrested the de-
fendant.
59
  Writing for the court, Judge Posner noted that had the 
undercover informant been an officer, he would have been justified 
in arresting Paul upon seeing the drugs in plain view.
60
  Also, the 
court noted that the undercover informant could have made a citi-
zen’s arrest had he so chosen.
61
  Thus, because the interests protected 
by Payton had been “fatally compromised when the owner admits a 
confidential informant and proudly displays contraband to him,” the 




The following year, the Seventh Circuit again found that the en-
try of police officers to assist in an arrest was valid under the Fourth 
Amendment even when the initial officer who gained consent had 
 
 54 660 F.2d 1178, 1183 (7th Cir. 1981). 
 55 Id. 
 56 Id. 
 57 808 F.2d 645, 646 (7th Cir. 1986). 
 58 Id. 
 59 Id. at 646–47. 
 60 Id. at 648. 
 61 Id. 
 62 Id. 
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left the room and then sought to re-enter.
63
  The main justification 
for the warrantless entry, though, was that the insistence of imposing 
a neutral magistrate and the warrant process would be an unneces-
sary and cumbersome safeguard because, by his initial consent, the 
defendant showed his willingness to allow the undercover officer into 
his motel room.
64
  Thus, the court reasoned that “it serves no purpose 
to require an arrest warrant where the same intrusion would occur 
whether or not the magistrate issued the warrant.”
65
  The court was 
careful to note, however, that the doctrine does not allow law en-
forcement agents to enter and exit a home at will—they may only do 
so to obtain help when making an arrest.
66
 
The Seventh Circuit again upheld the CORD where an infor-
mant, rather than an undercover officer, provided the signal for ar-
rest in United States v. Akinsanya.
67
  The court held that although the 
defendant consented only to the entry of the undercover informant, 
by doing so “he effectively gave consent to the agents with whom [the 
informant] was working.”
68
  Furthermore, the court rested its decision 
on the fact that consent is a valid substitute for a warrant and specifi-
cally stated that exigent circumstances
69
 were not implicated merely 





 63 United States v. Diaz, 814 F.2d 454, 459 (7th Cir. 1987) 
 64 Id. 
 65 Id. at 459 n.4 (citing United States v. White, 660 F.2d 1178, 1183 (7th Cir. 
1981)). 
 66 Id. at 459. 
 67 53 F.3d 852, 856 (7th Cir. 1995). 
 68 Id. 
 69 For a discussion of the “exigent circumstances” doctrine see, for example, 
Chapman v. United States, 365 U.S. 610, 615 (1961), Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 
10, 15 (1948), McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 455 (1948).  Although the jus-
tifications for exceptions to the warrant requirement in exigent circumstances also 
justify the easing of the warrant requirement in situations involving the CORD, the 
doctrine is not based upon such notions but instead is a compilation of doctrines 
which bring the circumstances outside the warrant requirement altogether.  For ex-
ample, the Supreme Court has noted that situations that make time of the essence 
sometimes mandate that strict adherence to the warrant requirement be eased.  See, 
e.g., Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499, 509 (1978) (building on fire); United States v. 
Santana, 427 U.S. 38, 42–43 (1976) (pursuit of a fleeing felon); Schmerber v. Cali-
fornia, 384 U.S. 757, 770–71 (1966) (destruction of evidence).  The easing of the 
warrant requirement in situations in which officers must enter to help subdue or ar-
rest an individual is supported by the same reasoning. 
 70 Akinsanya, 53 F.3d at 856 n.1. 
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Although the CORD originated in the Seventh Circuit, other 
circuits have since adopted it.  One year after Akinsanya, the U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit applied the CORD to a case 
involving the illegal sale of bird parts.
71
  Although the court explicitly 
adopted the rule from the Seventh Circuit, it also noted that it based 
its holding on a prior decision finding that once an individual gives 
consent to law enforcement to enter his premises, any expectation of 
privacy is diminished.
72
  In addition, the court determined that “any 
remaining expectation of privacy was outweighed by the legitimate 
concern for the safety of [the officers inside].”
73
 
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit also recently 
adopted the CORD in United States v. Pollard.
74
  Like the Ninth Circuit, 
the majority in Pollard found that “the back-up officers were acting 
within constitutional limits when they entered to assist [the under-
cover officer] since no further invasion of privacy was involved once 
the undercover officer made the initial entry.”
75
  Judge Jones, howev-
er, dissented, opining that the CORD did not meet the requirements 
needed under the Sixth Circuit’s precedent to recognize a new ex-
igency to waive the warrant requirement.
76
 
Despite Judge Jones’ dissent, the Sixth Circuit subsequently ex-
panded the CORD and applied it to a case involving an undercover 
police informant in United States v. Yoon.
77
  The court specifically 
noted that where an undercover informant, as opposed to a police 
officer, requests assistance, the analysis does not change; that is, the 
entry of the additional backup officers does not constitute an in-
creased intrusion of an individual’s privacy interests.
78
  Most notable, 
though, is the concurring opinion of Judge Kennedy.  Explaining why 
the CORD should apply to both undercover police officers and in-
formants, Judge Kennedy noted that the CORD does not rely on ei-
ther consent or exigent circumstances.
79
  Instead, the concurrence 
noted that by allowing an informant or undercover officer into his 
 
 71 United States v. Bramble, 103 F.3d 1475, 1477 (9th Cir. 1996). 
 72 Id. (citing United States v. Rubio, 727 F.2d 786, 797 (9th Cir. 1983)). 
 73 Id. (quoting Rubio, 727 F.2d at 797) (alterations in original). 
 74 215 F.3d 643, 649 (6th Cir. 2000). 
 75 Id. 
 76 Id. (Jones, J., dissenting). 
 77 398 F.3d 802, 808 (6th Cir. 2005). 
 78 Id.; see also id. at 811 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“[T]here is no justifiable dis-
tinction between the undercover officer’s and an informant’s ability to call upon the 
police to aid in the arrest.”). 
 79 Id. at 808–09. 
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house, a defendant compromises his privacy interests to such a de-
gree so as to prevent him from claiming that the entry of further of-
ficers violates this privacy interest.
80
 
Yoon also triggered a dissent which expressed “grave concern . . . 
because the extension of the doctrine to lay informants . . . entrusts 
to ordinary civilians law-enforcement powers previously given only to 
the police.”
81
  Despite the dissenting opinions in both Pollard and 
Yoon, the Sixth Circuit continues to apply the CORD irrespective of 
whether the agent requesting assistance is an undercover police of-
ficer or police informant.
82
 
In addition to the three federal courts of appeals, two state su-
preme courts have also adopted the CORD.
83
  The Supreme Court of 
New Jersey found that when officers gain consensual entry, have 
probable cause that a crime has occurred or is occurring, and then 
request backup to make an arrest, the entry of the additional officers 
is reasonable and therefore violates neither the federal nor New Jer-
sey Constitution.
84
  Likewise, the Supreme Court of Wisconsin 
deemed that where police officers enter following a pre-arranged sig-
nal indicating that the undercover agents inside have probable cause 
to arrest, no violation of the Fourth Amendment occurs.
85
 
Overall, based on a review of the jurisdictions that have ad-
dressed the issue, it seems that there is a trend towards recognition of 
the CORD as a valid expansion of police powers.  Moreover, once the 
additional officers enter the dwelling there are a number of doctrines 
already recognized by the Supreme Court that allow several searches 
to occur as incidental to any arrest without impinging on the values 
and rights protected by the Fourth Amendment. 
III. TYPES OF ANALYSIS UNDERTAKEN BY COURTS WHEN ANALYZING THE 
CORD 
 
 80 Id. at 809 (citing United States v. Paul, 808 F.2d 645, 648 (7th Cir. 1986); Unit-
ed States v. Bramble, 103 F.3d 1475, 1478 (9th Cir. 1996); United States v. Janik, 723 
F.2d 537, 548 (7th Cir. 1983)). 
 81 Id. at 813 (Gilman, J., dissenting). 
 82 United States v. Romero, 452 F.3d 610, 619 (6th Cir. 2006). 
 83 Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S, 223, 244 (2009). 
 84 New Jersey v. Henry, 627 A.2d 125, 131–32 (N.J. 1993). 
 85 Wisconsin v. Johnston, 518 N.W.2d 759, 762–63 (Wis. 1994).  Note, though, 
that the Wisconsin Supreme Court did not technically adopt the CORD as the court 
worried that the application of the term itself would be “confusing and unnecessary.”  
Id. at  765 n.6.  The legal reasoning of the decision, though, is directly parallel to that 
of the CORD, which the court explicitly acknowledged.  Id. 
KHALIL_FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 11/7/2011  1:45 PM 
2011] COMMENT 1583 
 
The majority of courts to address the CORD have found it con-
stitutional under the Fourth Amendment
86
 despite criticism that it is 
an undue expansion of law enforcement powers.
87
  Based on the 
holdings of three federal courts of appeals and two state supreme 
courts, the entry of additional officers to help undercover officers al-
ready inside a dwelling apparently amounts to a reasonable police ac-
tion and thus does not implicate Fourth Amendment concerns.  This 
of course assumes that the conduct and actions of the officers re-
mains within the scope of consent given;
88
 otherwise, an initially con-
stitutional search may be rendered unlawful.
89
  The basis of these 
holdings is that once a person has allowed an officer into his house, 
he has destroyed any subjective privacy interest which may have ex-
isted.
90
  In addition, the safety of officers outweighs any remaining 
privacy interest that could possibly be argued to still exist.
91
  Thus, 
courts have judged the entry of additional officers to be a reasonable 
 
 86 Some commentators conflate the CORD with other doctrines, namely the doc-
trine of third party consent, which is not implicated in most CORD cases.  See Ben 
Sobczak, Note, The Sixth Circuit’s Doctrine of Consent Once Removed: Contraband, Infor-
mants and Fourth Amendment Reasonableness, 54 WAYNE L. REV. 889, 902–03 (2008).  
Thus, the addition of extraneous elements alters any review of the CORD, as op-
posed to a review based on the components as listed supra Part II.  Moreover, com-
mentators applying the Supreme Court’s holding of Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103 
(2006), to a CORD analysis have further complicated the issue as Randolph involved 
the issue of consent to enter given by a cotenant and the refusal of consent from a 
present homeowner.  Sobczak, supra at 911.  See also Callahan v. Millard Cnty., 494 
F.3d 891, 902 n.3 (10th Cir. 2007) (Kelly, J., dissenting) (stating that Randolph has no 
effect on application of the CORD), rev’d on different grounds sub nom. Pearson v. Cal-
lahan, 555 U.S. 223 (2009).  In contrast, the CORD specifically contemplates consent 
by one with clear authority to give it, generally the defendant himself.  Compare Ran-
dolph, 547 U.S. at 113 (analyzing “the reasonableness of police entry in reliance on 
consent by one occupant subject to immediate challenge by another [occupant]”), 
with United States v. Pollard, 215 F.3d 643, 646 (6th Cir. 2000) (noting that defen-
dant readily admitted informant and undercover officer when they knocked on his 
door), and United States v. Bramble, 103 F.3d 1475, 1477 (9th Cir. 1996) (noting 
that defendant told undercover agents to come to his home, and upon their arrival 
invited them inside), and United States v. Diaz, 814 F.2d 454, 456 (7th Cir. 1987) (re-
cognizing that defendant admitted undercover agent into his hotel room).  Thus, 
the Supreme Court’s recent holding in Randolph would have little, if any, implica-
tions for the CORD. 
 87 See, e.g., Sobczak, supra note 86, at 903.  
 88 Lewis v. United States, 385 U.S. 206, 211 (1966). 
 89 See, e.g., Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 18–19 (1968). 
 90 See, e.g., Diaz, 808 F.2d at 648. 
 91 Transcript of Oral Argument at 30, Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223 (2009) 
(No. 07-751).  Justice Alito specifically noted that rejecting the CORD “is going to get 
police officers killed” if an officer tries to effectuate an arrest and is unable to request 
assistance from other officers outside a dwelling. Id.  
KHALIL_FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 11/7/2011  1:45 PM 
1584 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 41:1569 
 
intrusion under the Fourth Amendment and therefore not subject to 
the warrant requirement under various approaches of analysis. 
Although each court that has addressed the issue has found that 
the CORD is a valid extension of constitutional precedent, disagree-
ment has arisen as to whether the doctrine applies solely when an 
undercover police officer initiates the arrest or whether the CORD 
may also be applicable to undercover police informants.  Using dif-
ferent reasoning and analysis, some courts have determined that the 
CORD should apply regardless of whether an informant or police of-
ficer requests backup either because the defendant’s privacy interests 
have been compromised irrespective of the law enforcement agent 
involved,
92
 because the consent given to the informant gave him au-
thority to invite other law enforcement agents in,
93
 or because of the 
statutory power of citizens (and thus informants) to make arrests.
94
 
A. Privacy Analysis 
The Fourth Amendment is primarily concerned with the reason-
ableness of government intrusions and privacy interests,
95
 and thus, 
any doctrine that affects substantive Fourth Amendment rights must 
be analyzed with these principles in mind.  To pass constitutional 
muster, the additional entry of officers pursuant to the CORD must 
not unreasonably intrude on the privacy interests of the defendant. 
One of the earliest cases to apply the CORD, United States v. Paul, 
involved an undercover informant working with police in a sting op-
eration to arrest a seller of marijuana.
96
  Although the court noted 
that consent and the ability of the informant to make a citizen’s arrest 
would have supported the additional entry of police officers,
97
 it ex-
pressly extended the CORD to apply to informants because the pri-
mary interest protected by the Fourth Amendment “is the interest in 
the privacy of the home, and [it] has been fatally compromised when 
the owner admits a confidential informant and proudly displays con-
traband to him.”
98
  Moreover, the court noted that, in relation to an 
analysis of the reasonableness of the government intrusion, “[i]t 
 
 92 See, e.g., State v. Bramble, 103 F.3d 1475, 1477 (9th Cir. 1996) (quoting United 
States v. Rubio, 727 F.2d 786, 797 (9th Cir. 1983)). 
 93 United States v. Yoon, 398 F.3d 802, 807 (6th Cir. 2005). 
 94 Id. at 807 n.2. 
 95 See supra Part II.A. 
 96 808 F.2d 645, 646 (7th Cir. 1986). 
 97 Id. at 647–48. 
 98 Id. at 648. 
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Judge Kennedy, concurring with the Sixth Circuit’s decision in 
Yoon, followed the reasoning of Paul and stated that “the back-up of-
ficers entry into the suspect’s home does not offend the Constitution 
because the suspect’s expectation of privacy has been previously 
compromised.”
100
  Most notably, Judge Kennedy reasoned that the 
doctrine is based not on the exigent circumstances or consent excep-
tions to the warrant requirement but on a diminishment of the sus-
pect’s Fourth Amendment rights which resulted from allowing law 
enforcement officers to view his illegal activities.
101
  Judge Kennedy 
specifically reasoned that the defendant admitted the informant into 
his home and then showed the informant marijuana,
102
 “fatally com-
promis[ing]” his privacy interests.
103
  Consequently, the additional en-
try of officers was found not to be an unreasonable intrusion because 
of the defendant’s already diminished expectation of privacy.
104
 
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, however, found 
the distinction between police officers and informants to be of ma-
terial importance when applying the CORD.
105
  In Callahan v. Millard 
County, the court held that application of the CORD was improper 
when an informant, rather than a police officer, summoned the entry 
of additional officers.
106
  The court specifically declined to extend the 
consent given to an informant to additional police officers who 
sought to enter to effectuate an arrest.
107
  The Callahan court looked 
to whether the statutory power to arrest made a difference in analyz-
ing the powers of a police officer and an informant and specifically 
acknowledged the fact that police are given much more responsibility 
and authority than are ordinary citizens even when looking narrowly 




 99 Id. 
 100 United States v. Yoon, 398 F.3d 802, 810 (6th Cir. 2005) (Kennedy, J., concur-
ring). 
 101 Id. at 809–10. 
 102 Id. at 803 (majority opinion). 
 103 Id. at  809–10 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (quoting United States v. Paul, 808 
F.2d 645, 648 (7th Cir. 1986)). 
 104 Id. at 810. 
 105 494 F.3d 891, 896 (10th Cir. 2007), rev’d on different grounds sub nom. Pearson v. 
Callahan, 555 U.S. 223 (2009).  
 106 Id. at 896–97.  
 107 Id. at 899. 
 108 Id. at 897. 
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Judge Kelly dissented from the majority opinion in Callahan.  In 
applying an analysis focused on privacy and reasonableness, the dis-
sent noted that the “protection of the privacy of the individual . . . is 
forfeited when a homeowner freely allows government agents in-
side.”
109
  Judge Kelly also opined that the question to be decided “was 
whether Mr. Callahan’s consent to the confidential informant 
coupled with the subsequent drug transaction so eroded his legiti-
mate expectation of privacy that officers could enter his residence 
without a warrant in order to effectuate his arrest.”
110
  Moreover, the 
dissenting judge, Judge Kelly, noted that the CORD is somewhat of a 
misnomer as “the doctrine depends on more than consent alone.”
111
  
Instead, “the doctrine requires both a valid consensual entry—which 
alleviates the warrant requirement—and a concomitant destruction 




Based on privacy analysis, various courts have grappled with the 
balance that should be struck under the Fourth Amendment to de-
termine what is reasonable.  While no clear answer is provided as to 
whether a manifest difference exists in privacy expectations between 
allowing an undercover officer or a police informant to summon the 
aid of additional officers, these courts have followed recognized Su-
preme Court precedent in framing the question as one of seeking 
balance between privacy rights and government interests.  Because 
the Supreme Court has never couched its review of Fourth Amend-
ment violations in analysis of consent or statutory powers to arrest, an 
analysis based on privacy interests appears to be the most proper ap-
proach. 
B. Power to Arrest Analysis 
Even though police informants are just regular citizens, they are 
normally imbued with state power by the very fact that they are work-
ing closely with government actors.
113
  This fact, as well as the liability 
that the state may face for any actions of a police informant, has been 
important to some courts in deciding whether the CORD should ap-
 
 109 Id. at 900 (Kelly, J., dissenting) (internal quotations omitted) (citing Davis v. 
United States, 328 U.S. 582, 587 (1946)).   
 110 Callahan, 494 F.3d at 901. 
 111 Id.  
 112 Id.  
 113 See id. at 902 (majority opinion). 
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ply only to officers, or whether a situation involving an informant call-
ing for backup would also be within the purview of the CORD.
114
 
In United States v. Yoon, the Sixth Circuit analogized a CORD sit-
uation involving an informant to that involving a police officer.
115
  
Specifically noting that the state where the events took place autho-
rized citizens’ arrests, the court ruled that because the informant 
could have made the arrest himself it made no difference that instead 
he opted to request police assistance.
116
  The ability of either an in-
formant or a police officer to have carried out the arrest compelled 
the court to extend the application of the CORD to both. 
The Yoon court also relied on the Seventh Circuit’s holding in 
United States v. Paul, which found that because the informant could 
have arrested the defendant, the distinction between an officer and 
an informant should not alter the analysis as to whether the CORD 
should be applied in a given situation.
117
  Specifically, the court stated 
that the defendant had taken the risk of allowing an individual into 
his home and that the distinction between whether that individual 
was working with law enforcement or was actually a law enforcement 




The Tenth Circuit in Callahan v. Millard County recently consi-
dered whether the statutory power to arrest granted to citizens in 
most states supported expansion of the CORD to include informants 
as well because informants could make arrests as any ordinary citizen 
could under the law.
119
  The court, however, found such logic “un-
convincing.”
120
  Summarily dismissing this line of reasoning, the court 
stated “[t]hat a citizen has the power to arrest does not grant the citi-
zen all of the powers and obligations of the police as agents of the 
state.”
121
  Because of these distinct obligations and powers, the court 
refused to find that officers and informants should be treated similar-
ly when analyzing the proper application of the CORD even though a 
constitutional distinction was never found to exist between an entry 
 
 114 See id. 
 115 398 F.3d 802, 807–08 (6th Cir. 2005).  
 116 Id. at 807 n.2. 
 117 808 F.2d 645, 648 (7th Cir. 1986). 
 118 Id. 
 119 Callahan, 494 F.3d at 897. 
 120 Id. 
 121 Id. 
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The courts have basically sought an analogy between a law en-
forcement officer and an ordinary citizen given the statutory power to 
arrest.  This approach, however, is incorrect because it fails to take in-
to account the training, experience, and authority that a law en-
forcement officer possesses, which an ordinary informant lacks.  
Moreover, an analogy between a law enforcement officer and an or-
dinary citizen or informant takes little or no cognizance of the most 
important aspect in analyzing Fourth Amendment violations—the 
privacy rights of individuals.
123
 
C. Consent Analysis 
Where an individual consents to a search, the warrant require-
ment is obviated and a Fourth Amendment challenge cannot be 
raised.
124
  Some courts have used this reasoning as a foundation for 
the expansion of the CORD by extrapolating the consent given to an 
undercover officer or informant to apply to additional officers.
125
 
In United States v. Akinsanya, the Seventh Circuit held that 
“[w]hen [the defendant] Akinsanya gave his consent to [the under-
cover informant] Gilani to enter his apartment, he effectively gave 
consent to the agents with whom Gilani was working.”
126
  Thus, the 
court based its holding that the entry was not a violation of the 
Fourth Amendment on the fact that the consent given to the under-
cover informant could be extended to the officers with whom he was 
working, which would validate their entry.
127
  The court in United 
States v. Yoon similarly found that the CORD was based on consent 
and that, once consent is given, officers are entitled to enter and 
 
 122 Id. at 897–98.  
 123 Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 311 n.2 (1999) (Stevens, J., dissenting) 
(“‘Expectations of privacy and property interests govern the analysis of Fourth 
Amendment search and seizure claims.’” (quoting United States v. Padilla, 508 U.S. 
77, 82 (1993))). 
 124 United States v. Ringold, 335 F.3d 1168, 1174 (10th Cir. 2003) (“It has long 
been established that an officer may conduct a warrantless search consistent with the 
Fourth Amendment if the challenging party has previously given his or her voluntary 
consent to that search.”). 
 125 See, e.g., Callahan, 494 F.3d at 897. 
 126 United States v. Akinsanya, 53 F.3d 852, 856 (7th Cir. 1995). 
 127 Id. 
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conduct limited searches of the area pursuant to the consent given to 
an undercover officer or informant.
128
 
In contrast, though, the Tenth Circuit in Callahan rejected con-
sent as an appropriate ground on which to base the CORD.
129
  The 
majority refused to allow an informant invited inside a house to then 
turn around and invite police officers into the house because it was 
unwilling to expand the consent exception to such lengths.
130
  Simi-
larly, Judge Kennedy concurred in United States v. Yoon but explicitly 
based his reasoning on privacy analysis.
131
  He found that “[n]either 
the exigent circumstances nor the traditional consent exception to 
the warrant requirement supports the application of the ‘consent 
once removed’ doctrine.”
132
  Moreover, Judge Kennedy noted that 
“[a]lthough it is certainly true that an undercover agent or a gov-
ernment informant receives consent when he is invited into a sus-
pect’s home, it is a fiction to claim that the subsequent officers who 
enter the suspect’s home also receive the suspect’s consent to en-
ter.”
133
  Instead, Judge Kennedy found the expectation of privacy to 
be the deciding factor, and because the defendant had destroyed his 
expectation of privacy by showing his criminal activity to an outside 




Thus, although disagreement exists among the circuits, some 
support can be found for the argument that the CORD is based on 
consent given to officers that is then “once removed” to the backup 
officers entering to help arrest an individual.  Such reasoning allows 
courts to expand the scope of the original consent given when de-
termining whether or not a search is reasonable or outside the pur-
view of the warrant requirement.  It is not, however, an appropriate 
basis for the foundation of the CORD because to rest on consent 




 128 United States v. Yoon, 398 F.3d 802, 806 n.1 (6th Cir. 2005). 
 129 Callahan, 494 F.3d at 897.  
 130 Id. (“[T]he invitation of an informant into a house who then in turn invites the 
police  .  .  .  would require an expansion of the consent exception.  In this context, 
the person with authority to consent never consented to the entry of police into the 
house.”). 
 131 Yoon, 398 F.3d at 808 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 132 Id. 
 133 Id. at 809. 
 134 Id. at 809–10.  
 135 Specifically, as the court noted in Callahan, “a mere transient guest, without a 
‘substantial interest in or common authority over the property,’ cannot consent to 
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D. Using Privacy Analysis and Balancing to Determine the Proper 
Scope of the CORD 
Balancing privacy rights and government intrusion is the most 
proper method to analyze the CORD.  Because the Supreme Court 
has always analyzed reasonableness and privacy, and not the scope of 
consent or the power to arrest, in determining whether police con-
duct comports with the requirements of the Fourth Amendment, dis-
cerning whether the application of the CORD accords with what is 
considered reasonable is the most logical and legally sound analytical 
approach. 
Analysis of the CORD in relation to privacy and reasonableness 
balancing is the proper course to follow as opposed to reviewing the 
doctrine in a consent or statutory-power-to-arrest context.  In Ran-
dolph, the Supreme Court specifically held that police may not search 
a residence if the owner or resident objects even if a cotenant has 
consented.
136
  The Supreme Court’s holding in Randolph cuts against 
any argument that consent given from an owner to an undercover in-
formant then allows the informant to consent to the entry of police 
because cotenants have even greater rights than transient informants 
and even cotenants may not consent to such an entry under the hold-
ing of Randolph.  Thus, following the reasoning of Randolph, police 
would be unable to enter a house based on an informant’s consent 
because the homeowner will be present and would almost assuredly 
object.
137
  If such objections raise a Fourth Amendment bar as to co-
tenants, the dichotomy between homeowner and informant necessar-
ily indicates that the officers may not enter merely because the in-
formant consents.  The reasoning behind Judge Kelly’s approach in 
Callahan, in addition to the obstacle presented by the Supreme 
Court’s holding in Randolph, likewise counters the argument that 
“[t]he consent-once-removed doctrine allows one individual to re-
ceive consent from the homeowner and then pass that consent to 
another individual, who can then legally enter the home to assist the 
first individual.”
138
  As Judge Kelly noted, dissenting in Callahan, it is 
more than mere consent that serves as a basis for the CORD, but also 
 
the entry of others.” Callahan v. Millard Cnty., 494 F.3d 891, 899 (10th Cir. 2007) 
(citing United States v. Falcon, 766 F.2d 1469, 1474 (10th Cir. 1985)), rev’d on differ-
ent grounds sub nom. Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223 (2009). 
 136 Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103, 120 (2006).  
 137 See Sobczak, supra note 86, at 908–10 (rejecting the CORD based on third-party 
consent principles). 
 138 Sobczak, supra note 8, at 494. 
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a diminished, but not destroyed, subjective privacy interest.
139
  Courts 
should not be misled by the name of the doctrine, and should not re-
strict their analysis merely because the word “consent” is used. 
In addition to the existence of more than consent as a basis for 
the doctrine, a number of courts have noted differences between a 
police officer and an informant working for the state, which should 
be considered in deciding the appropriate scope of the CORD.  As 
the Tenth Circuit noted in Callahan, these distinctions should be ana-
lyzed in determining the reasonableness of a Fourth Amendment 
search.
140
  For example, courts have noted that the obligations police 
officers have but private citizens lack, such as the duty to execute war-
rants, raise an important issue in determining Federal Tort Claims 
Act liability when applied to a police officer as opposed to a private 
citizen making a citizen’s arrest.
141
  Similarly, the citizen’s arrest power 
is considered not to include certain privileges and duties inherent in 
the position of other law enforcement offices.
142
 
Accordingly, because the Supreme Court generally reviews 
Fourth Amendment violations in terms of privacy, this interest must 
frame the analysis of any entry by police officers instead of one based 
on consent or a statutory power to arrest.
143
 
IV. THE CORD SHOULD NOT BE EXTENDED TO POLICE INFORMANTS 
As a practical matter, disregarding the difference between in-
formants and police officers raises a number of risks, including the 
overextension of a doctrine that, if abused, could allow police officers 
to subvert the protections of the Fourth Amendment.  Using the Su-
preme Court’s evaluative framework centered on privacy and reason-
ableness, rather than an analysis based on consent or statutory powers 
to arrest, provides courts with the adequate tools to examine and de-
cide issues involving the Fourth Amendment, such as the CORD.  In 
addition to differences in statutory powers, the distinction between 
informants and officers raises important issues regarding the reason-
 
 139 See supra Part III.A. 
 140 Callahan, 494 F.3d at 897. 
 141 Arnsberg v. United States, 757 F.2d 971, 979 (9th Cir. 1985). 
 142 Caban v. United States, 728 F.2d 68, 73–74 (2d Cir. 1984); see also United States 
v. Hillsman, 522 F.2d 454, 461 (7th Cir. 1975) (discussing the difference of powers 
between police officers making an arrest and an individual private party making a 
citizen’s arrest). 
 143 See, e.g., Washington v. Chrisman, 455 U.S. 1, 8 (1982); Katz v. United States, 
389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967). 
KHALIL_FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 11/7/2011  1:45 PM 
1592 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 41:1569 
 
ableness of a search and various privacy concerns.
144
  Specifically, 
commentators have argued that informants should not be granted 




For instance, in an amicus brief to the Supreme Court in Calla-
han,
146
 the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) argued that the 
CORD should not extend to informants because they are not as 
trustworthy as police officers.
147
  This is important because a court 
must decide under the objective prong of the Fourth Amendment 
test whether society is ready to recognize that informants should be 
treated similarly to police officers when conducting searches and en-
gaging in other law enforcement activities.  Although the Court has 
noted that when an individual invites someone into his home, be it a 
police officer or police informant, he has broken the “seal of sanctity” 
and has waived his right to privacy in the premises,
148
 the recognition 
has also long existed that the risk taken is that the confidant may re-
port actions or statements to the police, but not that he may imme-
diately summon police to effectuate an arrest.
149
  This is an important 
distinction because the Court has previously limited the power of po-
lice to barge into a home without a warrant, which would be sub-
verted by this notion of “breaking the seal.”  If the Court had found 
such an expansion of police powers warranted, it could have simply 
allowed for police to enter the home immediately instead of creating 




 144 Callahan, 494 F.3d at 896 (“We find the distinctions between an officer and an 
informant summoning additional officers to be significant.”). 
 145 See infra note 148 and accompanying text.  
 146 On appeal to the Supreme Court the case name changed to Pearson v. Calla-
han.  
 147 Brief for the American Civil Liberties Union as Amicus Curiae Supporting 
Respondent  at 15, Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223 (Aug. 11, 2008) (No. 07-751) 
[hereinafter ACLU Brief]. 
 148 Lewis v. United States, 385 U.S. 206, 213 (1966). 
 149 This principle is known as the “unreliable ear doctrine,” which allows police to 
wiretap an informant and record conversations with an individual without violating 
any Fourth Amendment privacy interests because the individual has taken the risk 
that the person may be reporting to police.  See, e.g., United States v. White, 401 U.S. 
745, 750 (1971); Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 303 (1966).  In both cases, the 
Court never hinted that police may then barge into a home when they learned illegal 
activity was taking place inside a dwelling by listening to the wiretap, and such action 
would almost surely violate the Court’s arrest warrant requirement set forth in Pay-
ton. 
 150 See White, 401 U.S. 745; Hoffa, 385 U.S. 293.  If “breaking the seal” of the home 
eviscerated the privacy right of the homeowner, the unreliable ear doctrine would be 
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A recent case from the Tenth Circuit highlights the stark differ-
ence between police and informants and illustrates why the CORD 
should apply to the former but not the latter.  Besides training, pow-
er, reliability, character, and the like, the conduct of informants calls 
into question whether they should be granted the trust and authority 
generally reserved only to police officers.  In Callahan v. Millard Coun-
ty, officers learned of a planned methamphetamine sale from a con-
fidential informant.
151
  The informant, however, drank six-to-eight 
beers in the preceding three hours, and also had ingested some of 
the methamphetamine that was part of the proposed drug transac-
tion.
152
  While the police became aware of the informant’s intoxicated 
state, they did not realize that he had also ingested illegal drugs.
153
  
Despite his condition, the officers planned to use the informant as 
part of a drug-bust, but they first made him drink coffee prior to the 
operation to help ensure his competency.
154
 
Although the court made no findings as to whether the infor-
mant was still intoxicated while the operation occurred, the infor-
mant did not give the correct signal for officers to enter; instead, he 
gave a variation of the signal that the officers took as their cue to en-
ter.
155
  While this case presents an extreme example of the type of in-
formants police may use, undercover informants are often themselves 




These differences are important to note because allowing an of-
ficer into a home does not destroy one’s privacy interest as some 
 
meaningless—police could simply rely on an informant’s report and enter a home.  
Because, instead, the Court required a warrant based on such informant’s  reporting, 
the notion of “breaking the seal” and destroying all privacy rights must be rejected.  
See Initial Brief of Appellee-Respondent at 12, Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223 
(Aug. 11, 2008) (No. 07-751) (“This Court has held that an informant may reveal in-
formation to the police that was revealed to the informant inside a home, but the 
Court has never approved a warrantless home entry based simply on an informant’s 
prior entry.”). 
 151 Callahan v. Millard Cnty., No. 2:04-CV-00952, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 32665 at 
*3 (D. Utah May 18, 2006), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 494 F.3d 891 (10th Cir. 2007), 
rev’d on different grounds sub nom. Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223 (2009). 
 152 Id. at *3–4. 
 153 Id. at *3. 
 154 Id. 
 155 Callahan, 494 F.3d at 893. 
 156 See, e.g., United States v. Akinsanya, 53 F.3d 852, 857 (7th Cir. 1995) (noting 
that informant was an “experienced drug dealer”); see also Callahan, 2006 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 32665 at *2–3 (acknowledging that the confidential informant only served as 
such after being arrested for drug possession). 
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 doing so instead only diminishes it.
158
  If the 
mere fact that an officer was present in one’s home was sufficient to 
destroy one’s privacy interest, no basis or need would exist for any of 
the search exceptions outlined above, such as the plain view doctrine, 
searches incident to arrest, or protective sweeps.
159
  Indeed, if the 
presence of an officer in a home would destroy the privacy interests 
of the homeowner, the CORD would be a foregone conclusion and 
an individual would have no grounds to object.  Thus, the difference 
between allowing an officer or an informant to signal others to enter 
is of vital importance because a homeowner still maintains some pri-
vacy interests despite allowing an agent of law enforcement into his 
home to view his illegal activities. 
The ACLU, writing as amicus in Callahan, raised the most com-
pelling argument as to why informants should be distinguished from 
police officers for CORD purposes.  “[I]nformants undergo none of 
the training that law-enforcement officers receive and thus are typi-
cally unschooled in the law and law enforcement techniques.”
160
  
Moreover, “[p]olice officers receive extensive instruction and pass ri-
gorous tests.  They must complete field and classroom trainings, as 
well as satisfy background checks, prior to taking their oath of of-
fice.”
161
  The fact that officers are entrusted with enormous power and 
discretion, and subject to extensive training
162
 and examination, fur-
ther separates them as a class from the ordinary informant who would 
be involved in a CORD case.
163
 
The court in United States v. Jachimko also questioned whether in-
formants should be granted the same powers as police officers.  Spe-
cifically, the court asked whether an informant could be entrusted to 
act within the narrow limits that the Supreme Court established on 
investigative activity within a dwelling that occurs without a warrant, 
and how informants, generally of suspect character, can be trusted to 




 157 United States v. Yoon, 398 F.3d 802, 807–08 (6th Cir. 2005) (Kennedy, J., con-
curring). 
 158 United States v. Bramble, 103 F.3d 1475, 1478 (9th Cir. 1996) (citing United 
States v. Rubio, 727 F.2d 786, 797 (9th Cir. 1983).  
 159 See supra Part B.2. 
 160 ACLU Brief, supra note 147, at 17. 
 161 Id. at 17–18. 
 162 Initial Brief of Appellee-Respondent, supra note 150, at 31 (“Police are trained 
in conducting such arrests safely, while informants typically are not.”). 
 163 ACLU Brief, supra note 147, at 18. 
 164 United States v. Jachimko, 905 F. Supp. 540, 540 (N.D. Ill. 1995). 
KHALIL_FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 11/7/2011  1:45 PM 
2011] COMMENT 1595 
 
rent case law recognizes this difference by generally extending the 
CORD only to police officers, and not to undercover informers.
165
 
All of these differences between police officers and informants 
lead to the conclusion that while it may be reasonable to trust the de-
cision of an officer to summon additional backup upon viewing illeg-
al activity and to begin the arrest process, it is unreasonable to extend 
such trust to informants who are generally untrained and of dubious 
character.
166
  Indeed, informants do not even possess the full range of 
powers that police officers may exercise just because the police have 
employed them in the execution of a law enforcement operation, or 
because a statute has granted them the power to make arrests.
167
  
While the subjective privacy interest of a defendant is arguably wea-
kened by the defendant’s admission of a confidant who, unbek-
nownst to the defendant, is an informant, society is most likely not 
ready to recognize informants as being on par with law enforcement 
officers, and will mostly likely object to granting them similar power 
and authority.  In sum, the privacy intrusion is increased when an 
undercover informant, as opposed to a police officer, is allowed to 
summon backup officers, and the reasonableness of such conduct is 
lessened.  Because the difference between an undercover informant 
and an undercover officer is one of kind, rather than one of degree, 
 
 165 3 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE, § 6.1 (4th ed. 2009).  Professor La-
Fave writes: 
[I]t has frequently been held that no warrant is needed where the ar-
rest is made within premises to which an undercover police officer 
gained admittance by indicating his interest in participating therein in 
criminal activity.  That result is not surprising, as it squares with ana-
logous Supreme Court and lower court decisions on the use of under-
cover agents. But the mere fact that a wired informant is inside the 
house, so that the police outside are able to hear the offense occurring 
(meaning the offense, albeit not committed in public, has occurred in 
the surveilling officer’s presence) does not excuse the Payton warrant 
requirement. 
Id. (internal citations omitted). 
 166 The ACLU, writing as amicus in Callahan, raised a valid point:  
Informants usually have criminal convictions or charges pending 
against them and for good reasons are not entrusted with the consi-
derable authority granted to police officers.  Informants, after all, find 
themselves in their position not because the government believes they 
can reliably enforce the law, but often for precisely the opposite rea-
son: they have previously violated the law. 
ACLU Brief, supra note 147, at 17. 
 167 See, e.g., Callahan v. Millard Cnty., 494 F.3d 891, 897 (10th Cir. 2007), rev’d on 
different grounds sub nom. Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223 (2009). 
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courts should not extend the CORD to grant the same powers and 
authority to informants. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Every court to address the issue has found that the CORD is a va-
lid extension of existing case law.  Every component, except for the 
additional entry of officers, has already been decided and approved 
by the Supreme Court.  The remaining element does not change the 
privacy analysis because the entry of backup officers constitutes a mi-
nimal additional intrusion on privacy.  Moreover, whatever minor 
additional intrusion on privacy may result from the entry of addition-
al officers is more than outweighed by the concern for the safety of 
the officers inside.  The government-interest side of the balance 
therefore outweighs the personal interest in privacy. 
The balance, however, changes when an undercover police in-
formant, as opposed to an officer, gains entry and signals the arrest 
team.  Because of the difference in training, authority, and expe-
rience, among other things, the intrusion resulting from the entry of 
police officers summoned by a fellow officer is of a different type 
than that of officers summoned by a police informant.  The fact that 
a police informant, who usually has no training and is sometimes of 
questionable moral character, summons police to enter alters the 
Fourth Amendment balancing, and thus, the CORD should not apply 
when the police use an informant as an undercover operative.  While 
some courts have based the expansion of the CORD to informants on 
a citizen’s authority to affect an arrest or on some sort of transfer of 
consent from informant to the entering officers, the proper analysis 
must be one of privacy intrusions and reasonableness, as required by 
Supreme Court precedent. 
Accordingly, courts should find the balance decidedly in favor of 
the personal and constitutional interests of the private homeowners.  
Allowing undercover informants to enter the home and initiate an 
arrest or to summon police officers is a situation wholly removed 
from one where all of the parties involved are trained law enforce-
ment officers.  The Fourth Amendment grants the greatest protec-
tion to the home, and exceptions to the warrant requirement are 
closely restrained.  As such, courts should be wary of extending a doc-
trine, though valid when involving trusted law enforcement officers, 
to encompass anyone whom the police may use as undercover infor-
mants.  Because of the distinctions in type and kind between lay in-
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formants and trained officers, courts should not expand the scope of 
the CORD to include informants. 
 
